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JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE
CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS
In enacting the Clean Air Amendments of 1970,' Congress sought
to remedy the lack of uniform national air quality standards, the paucity
of state-federal coordination, and above all, the absence of meaningful
federal enforcement authority which had plagued previous federal at-
tempts to achieve air pollution control.2 Although the original dates for
establishing and attaining national air quality standards under the
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (1970)) [hereinafter cited as Amendments];
H.R. REP. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as HousE
REPORT];
S. RzP. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT];
K. DAvIs, ADMimSTRATIVE LAw TREATISE (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAVIs];
L. JAFFE, JuDiCrAL CONTROL OF ADMINSTrATvE AcMON (1965) [hereinafter cited
as JAFim].
1. Amendments.
2. The earliest federal effort to regulate air pollution was the enactment of the Air
Pollution Control Act, ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955), which was designed to promote
research and to support local abatement efforts. Subsequent legislation directed the
surgeon general to investigate the effect of motor vehicle emissions on health. Act of
June 8, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-493, 74 Stat. 162. In 1963 the federal government was
authorized to increase its support for research and local control, and to exercise limited
enforcement authority over some forms of interstate pollution. Clean Air Act, Pub. L.
No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963). The Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81
Stat. 485, brought about some expansion of federal enforcement authority, but left to the
states the critical matters of setting air quality standards and attainment schedules. For
a review and analysis of legislation antecedent to the 1970 Amendments, see Train v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 63-65 (1975); Greco, The Clean Air
Amendments of 1970: Better Automotive Ideas from Congress, 12 B.C. INo. & CoM. L
REv. 571, 581, 589 (1971); O'Fallon, Deficiencies in the Air Quality Act of 1967, 33
LAw & CoNTEmp. PROB. 275 (1968); Comment, Variance Procedures Under the Clean
Air Act. The Need for Flexibility, 15 WM. & MARY L REv. 324, 324 n.1 (1973).
Both houses of Congress put repeated emphasis on the inadequacies of previous
legislation in justifying the Amendments:
Air pollution continues to be a threat to the health and well-being of the
American people. While a start has been made in controlling air pollution
since the enactment of the Air Quality Act of 1967, progress has been regret-
tably slow. This has been due to a number of factors: (1) cumbersome and
time-consuming procedures called for under the 1967 act . . [references to
technological problems] ... and (6) last, but not least, failure on the part of
the National Air Pollution Control Administration to demonstrate sufficient
aggressiveness in implementing present law. HOUSE REPORT 5.
See also SENATE REPORT 3.
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Amendments have passed, s many states are still in the process of gaining
necessary federal approval for details of their air quality implementation
plans,4 and revisions of plans already approved are constantly being
proposed." Therefore, the obligations of industries subject to the feder-
ally supervised state regulation mandated by the Amendments have not
yet been fully defined, and affected industries have a continuing interest
in obtaining adequate judicial review of administrative determinations
made pursuant to the Amendments.
As with all forms of federal regulation, administrative action under
the Amendments which has an impact of substantial finality on the
parties being regulated is subject to a presumption of judicial reviewabil-
ity.6 The statute itself specifies procedures to be followed in a number
of situations where review is clearly appropriate.7 As the developing
case law demonstrates, however, Congress did not begin to envision the
multitude of legal and factual circumstances in which some form of
judicial review might reasonably be demanded. Nor have the courts
confronted with these demands been able to arrive at consistent answers
to the questions of when statutory or extra-statutory review should be
permitted, what forms it should take, and at what stages of the review
proceedings particular kinds of issues should be raised.8
3. The target date for achieving the national primary standards was May, 1975.
Although this date does not appear explicitly in the Amendments, it can be calculated
from the time limitations on the various procedures which are mandated. See Comment,
Variance Procedures Under the Clean Air Act, supra note 2, at 327 n.14. See notes 9-
15 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the relevant statutory provisions.
4. See, e.g., 5 BNA ENvIRONMaNT RP. 452-53 (1974) (summarizing a number of
state regulations belatedly issued during 1974). Extensions of statutory deadlines,
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) dissatisfaction with original state submissions,
protracted litigation, and inevitable bureaucratic delay have all contributed to the failure
to meet the Amendments' goals on schedule. See Air: Turning the Corner, NAr'L
W.DL B 21 (Feb.-Mar. 1976).
5. Each state implementation plan is required to have a workable revision provi-
sion. Amendments § 110(a)(2)(H), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (H) (1970). See also
Amendments § 110(a) (3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-5(a) (3) (Supp. 1976). Additionally,
section 111, dealing with new sources, incorporates the general procedure of section 110
for the development of state standards applicable to these new sources and the federal
approval of these new standards. Amendments § 111(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6(d)
(Supp. M, 1973). The problems arising in the application of section 111 are discussed
in Oliato Chapter of the Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
6. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Gardner v. Toilet
Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167 (1967). See generally Note, Statutory Preclusion of Judicial
Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 1976 DUKn W. 431; 5 U.S.C. 55 702,
704 (1970). In enacting the Amendments, Congress evinced specific concern -for the
implications of the APA and recent cases construing it. SENATB REPORT 40-41.
7. Amendments § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970); Amendments § 307(b), 42
U.S.C.A. § 1857h-5(b) (Supp. 1976). These provisions governing judicial review are
discussed at notes 20-23 infra and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., West Penn Power Co. v. Train, 522 F.2d 302, 308 n.25 (3d Cir. 1975);
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The purpose of this Note is to review the statutory scheme as
presently construed, to analyze critically the approaches taken to the
judicial review problem in the leading recent cases, and to suggest an
alternative framework for judicial review under the Amendments with a
view toward reducing the confusion so frequently expressed and re-
flected by courts and litigants.
THE STATUTORY ORIGINS OF THE JUDICIAL REVIEW PROBLEM
The Statutory Scheme
The operation of the Clean Air Amendments involves three princi-
pal phases: the setting of national air quality standards," the develop-
ment, adoption, and federal approval of state plans to implement those
national standards,10 and the enforcement of the state plans to ensure
that the national standards are achieved and maintained."1
While the details of many state plans have not yet been made final,
the first two phases are for the most part complete. The Amendments
required the Administrator of the United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) to promulgate, shortly after enactment, national
primary and secondary air quality standards for all pollutants which had
been identified as threats to public health or welfare.1 2  After promul-
gation of the national standards, each state was to submit to the EPA a
more specific plan for implementing these standards.' 3 EPA approval
was to be given to a state plan if a set of enumerated criteria were met.' 4
Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 197-3), modified, "522 F.2d 1186 (3d
Cir. 1975); Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1125 (1973).
9. Amendments § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970).
10. Amendments § 110, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-5 (Supp. 1976).
11. Amendments § 113, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-8 (Supp. 1976). For concise reviews
of the statutory scheme, see Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60,
64-68 (1975);.Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 483 F.2d 690, 691-92 (8th
Cir. 1973).
12. Primary standards are those which the EPA Administrator determines "are
requisite to protect the public health." Amendments § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-
4(b) (1) (1970). Secondary standards are those necessary "to protect the public welfare
from any known or anticipated adverse effects" of air pollution. Amendments §
109(b) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b)(2) (1970). The standards are set out in 40 C.F.R.
§§ 50.1 -.11 (1973).
13. Amendments § 110(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-5(a) (Supp. 1976). The plans
were to provide for the attainment of the national primary standard within three years,
and for attainment of the national secondary standard within "a reasonable time."
14. Amendments §§ 110(a)(2)(A)-(H), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-5(a)(2)(A)-(H)
(1970). The criteria include the presence of a specific program adequate to ensure
timely attainment of the national standards, sufficient funding, personnel, facilities, and
[V/ol. 1976:450
CLEAR AIR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Such approval is also required before a state can effectively revise its
plan.15
Enforcement under the Amendments is a joint state-federal effort.
Primary responsibility for enforcement of the implementation plans rests
with the states. 16 The enforcement provision of the Amendments,
authority for monitoring and enforcement, and a workable provision for necessary
revisions.
15. Amendments § 110(a)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-5(a)(3) (Supp. 1976). Sec-
tion 110 provides further for the extension of submission deadlines, Amendments §
110(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(b) (1970), for the promulgation of implementation plans
by EPA in default of state action, Amendments § 110(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-5(c)
(Supp. 1976), and, under extraordinary circumstances, for the extension of the national
deadline with respect to an entire state, Amendments § 110(e), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(e)
(1970), or to a source or class of sources within a state, Amendments § 110(f), 42
U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f) (1970).
The question of when a state is required to use the section 110(f) procedure to
modify its implementation plan was decided in Train v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975). The Fifth Circuit had sustained NRDC's argument that
section 110(f) is the sole means by which a state may revise its plan so as to postpone
its application to a particular pollution source. Natural Resources Defense Council v.
EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974). In similar challenges to EPA approval of the
variance procedures of state plans, the First, Second, and Eighth Circuits had held that a
state, "as a necessary adjunct to the statutory scheme," had an inherent, extra-statutory
right to revise its plan without recourse to section 110(f) at any time before the state
was scheduled to attain the national air quality standard. See Natural Resources
Defense Council v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875, 887 (1st Cir. 1973). After the scheduled
attainment dates, these courts held, the state could revise its plan only if the cumbersome
procedure of section 110(f) were followed. See Natural Resources Defense Council v.
EPA, 494 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1974); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 483
F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1973); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875
(1st Cir. 1973). The Ninth Circuit rejected the pre- and post-attainment date distinc-
tion but followed the First Circuit in finding an inherent power for a state to make such
revisions in its plan as would not interfere with attainment or maintenance of national
standards. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905, 912 (9th Cir.
1974). The Supreme Court adopted the simple expedient of reading the statute as it was
written, holding that section I10(a) (3) governs the federal approval of revisions which
do not compromise national standards (i.e. those revisions which meet the criteria
specified in section 110(a)(2)(A)-(H)). The Court found that section 110(f) "was
intended merely as a method of escape from the -mandatory deadlines," and that its
procedure is therefore appropriate only for the approval of variances or revisions
threatening the national standards. 421 U.S. at 84. Any attempt to distinguish
"revision" from "postponement" on the basis of specificity was rejected as "specious."
Id. at 97-98. See generally Hardy, Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council: The
Genesis of a New Era of Federal-State Relationships in Air Pollution Control, 24
CLEv. ST. L REv. 397 (1975).
16. See Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975);
SENATE REPORT 21. Note the requirement of section 110(a) (2) (f) that each state have
adequate authority to enforce its plan. For an example of the complexities inherent in
joint state-federal enforcement, see Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.
1973), modified, 522 F.2d 11-86 (3d Cir. 1975). See generally Luneburg, Federal-State
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however, imposes an independent duty on -the EPA Administrator to
notify any person he believes to be acting in violation of an approved
and currently applicable state implementation plan.17 If such violation
continues for more than thirty days, the Administrator "may" either
initiate a civil action in a United States district court to compel compli-
ance with the plan, or issue an administrative order directing compliance
which is itself enforceable in a civil action.' The Amendments pre-
scribe substantial penalties for knowingly violating a compliance order
or ignoring a violation notice issued by the EPA.'9
An enforcement suit will necessarily provide an opportunity for
judicial review of the administrative actions on which the suit is based.
Additionally, the Amendments provide explicitly for two other forms of
judicial review. First, EPA action on a proposed state implementation
plan or revision is immediately reviewable in the court of appeals of "the
appropriate circuit." 20  Consideration in enforcement proceedings of
Interaction Under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 14 B.C. IND. & CaM. L. REV. 637
(1973).
17. (a)(1) Whenever, on the basis of any information available to him, the
Administrator finds that any person is in violation of any requirement of an
applicable implementation plan, the Administrator shall notify the person in
violation of the plan and the State in which the plan applies of such finding.
If such violation extends beyond the 30th day after the date of the Administra
tor's notification, the Administrator may issue an order requiring such person
to comply with the requirements of such plan or he may bring a civil action
in accordance with subsection (b) of this section. Amendments § 113(a) (1),
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(1) (1970).
18. Id.; Amendments § 113(b), 42 U.S.C.A. 1857c-8(b) (Supp. 1976) (authorizing
the EPA Administrator to commence a civil action to either enforce his compliance
order or to enjoin violations of a state plan). It is unclear whether the Administrator is
required to take either of these two steps, or whether action beyond the issuance of a
violation notice is entirely discretionary. See notes 112-14 infra and accompanying text.
19. Persons who knowingly violate orders issued pursuant to section 113 are subject
to a fine of not more than $25,000 per day of violation, or imprisonment for not more
than one year, or both. Amendments § 113(c)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-8(c)(1)
(Supp. 1976).
20. Amendments § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (Supp. 1976), pro-
vides in pertinent part:
A petition for review of the Administrator's action in approving or promul-
gating any implementation plan... may be filed only in the United States
Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit. Any such petition shall be filed
within 30 days from the date of such promulgation, approval, or action, or
after such date if such petition is based solely on grounds arising after such
30th day.
EPA action in promulgating national standards is reviewable in the court of appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit. Id. While the statute does permit a petition for
review to be filed after the thirty-day limitation period when it is based on grounds
arising after that date, it is often difficult to ascertain the point at which such grounds
have in fact arisen. This difficulty is illustrated by Union Elee. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d
206 (8th Cir. 1975), and Oljato Chapter of the Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
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matters which could have been raised previously in such a review action
is specifically foreclosed.21 Second, a unique "citizen suit" provision
grants jurisdiction to federal district courts to hear suits brought by "any
person" against alleged violators of any state or federal standard adopted
pursuant to the Amendments, or against the EPA for alleged failure
to perform nondiscretionary duties. 22  The main purpose of this provi-
sion apparently is to provide a meaningful. check on EPA laxity in
enforcement. 3
The Problem
Despite the apparent comprehensiveness of the Amendments' re-
view provisions, the courts construing these provisions have been unable
to arrive at a consistent answer to the question of when affected indus-
tries should raise particular types of objections to state and federal
action in developing, approving, revising, and enforcing implementation
plans.24 Thus, while these industries face foreclosure of objections not
raised at the proper time and in the appropriate tribunal,25 they are
without definitive judicial guidelines in timing the exercise of their
statutory right to judicial review.
21. "Action of the Administrator with respect to which review could have been
obtained [in an initial review proceeding] shall not be subject to judicial review in civil
or criminal proceedings for enforcement." Amendments § 307(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. §
1857h-5(b)(2) (1970).
22. (a) Establishment of right to bring suit.
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person may
commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Admin-
istrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary
with the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an emission
standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to
peform such act or duty, as the case may be.
(b) Notice.
No action may be commenced-
(2) under subsection (a) (2) of this section prior to 60 days after the plain-
tiff has given notice of such action to the Administrator. Amendments § 304,
42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970).
See SENATE REPOaT 38 (discussing the uniqueness of this provision).
23. See SENATE REPORT 3. The topic of judicial review under the Amendments has
been generally reviewed in Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of
the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509 (1974); Comment, Coordinating the EPA, NEPA,
and the Clean Air Act, 52 Tx. L Ray. 527, 550-56 (1974); Note, Reviewability:
Statutory Limitations on the Availability of Judicial Review, 1973 Durn L.J. 253.
24. See cases cited at note 8 supra.
25. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
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At the heart of the problem is the question of what issues must be
raised on direct review of EPA approval of a state implementation plan
or revision. On the one hand, several cases have suggested that any
remotely foreseeable present or future objection arising in relation to a
state plan must be raised at the time of EPA approval. 26  On the other
hand, it recently has been held that only general objections to the overall
policy of a state plan are reviewable at this time.2 7
Obviously, the safest course for the affected industry to pursue is to
raise all possible objections on initial review of EPA approval. Encour-
aging this position, however, is undesirable for at least two reasons.
First, as a practical matter, the full implications of an objection which is
foreseeable only in a very general way may not yet be discernible at the
time of plan approval, resulting in an inadequate discussion and resolu-
tion of the issues involved.28 Second, even if enough information is
available to allow the objection to be fully developed, the delay inevita-
ble in a judicial determination of complex technological questions may
defeat Congress's clearly expressed intent to expedite attainment of the
national standards.29  An arguable interpretation of the Amendments'
legislative history is that no tactic which will unduly delay the pre-
attainment procedure is to be tolerated, and that complex objections to a
plan which would have a delaying effect are to be brought not before the
courts, but before Congress itself as amendment proposals.8 0
If, alternatively, the industry is not permitted to raise all conceiva-
ble objections to an implementation plan at the time of approval, the
current inconsistency in judicial interpretation of the Amendments may
subject it to the risk of having its interests adversely affected without
adequate review of its objections. Besides initial review in a federal
court of appeals, the Amendments provide an industry subject to a plan
26. See, e.g., St. Joe Mineral Corp. v. EPA, 508 F.2d 743, 747-49 (3d Cir. 1975);
Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, 358 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1125 (1973); West Penn Power Co. v. Train, 378 F. Supp. 941, 945-47 (W.D. Pa.
1974), affd on other grounds, 522 F.2d 302, 309 (3d Cir. 1975) (the trial and appellate
courts presenting the two conflicting views on initial reviewability).
27. West Penn Power Co. v. Train, 522 F.2d 302, 309 (3d Cir. 1975).
28. For example, the ultimate technological implications of a particular plan provi-
sion are likely to be only dimly foreseeable at the time an affected industry becomes
subject to the plan. See note 61 infra and cases cited therein for a discussion of other
aspects of the problem.
29. See SEnATm REPORT 2-3; 116 CONG. REc. 32,900-05 (1970) (remarks of
Senator Muskie).
30. See 116 CoNG. REc. 32,905 (1970) (remarks of Senator Muskie). Senator
Muskie suggested that objections requiring complex substantive determinations were not
proper subjects for judicial review, but rather should be brought to Congress's attention
as possible grounds for revision of the Amendments themselves.
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to which it objects with three courses of relief; but none of these
guarantees meaningful review.
The first option is to rely on review of the objectionable aspects of
a state plan by the courts or the appropriate administrative agency of the
state concerned.31 The implementation plans or administrative proce-
dure statutes of most states provide for the granting of a stay of
enforcement during the pendency of such review32 Under the Amend-
ments, however, activity in violation of an approved plan is subject to
federal sanctions, regardless of any state determinations.83 Moreover,
any ultimate federal penalties will be calculated from the date of the
violation notice which the EPA Administrator is required to issue to any
person he believes to be acting in contravention of the most recently
approved version of a state plan.3 4 An alleged polluter without absolute
confidence in the correctness of his position is thus deterred from relying
on available state remedies by the knowledge that he may be heavily
penalized for his activities during the time required to complete the state
process.
The second possible course of relief is the citizen suit provision."
This provision, however, appears by its terms and purpose to be inappli-
cable to the situation of an affected industry seeking judicial review of a
state plan or its application. 6
A third option is to do nothing and await the opportunity to raise
objections not suitable for initial court of appeals review as a defense in
a statutory enforcement action brought by the EPA.37  Here again, an
affected industry faces the accrual of penalties from the date of the
issuance of a violation notice. Following the required issuance of the
notice, the form and timing of further enforcement proceedings are at
31. An example is the procedure for the granting of variances and subsequent review
set forth in 25 PA. CODE § 141; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, H9 4004(4), 4013.5 (Supp. 1975);
id. tit. 71 § 1710.41.
32. See, e.g., 25 PA. CODE § 141.5.
33. In other words, a state ruling apparently has no binding effect on federal offi-
cials, and thus a party found in compliance with the applicable standards by the state
may nonetheless be subject to federal sanction. See notes 83-86 infra and accompanying
text.
34. See notes 16-19 supra and accompanying text. Any person knowingly refusing
to comply with a violation notice for more than thirty days after its issuance becomes
subject to a fine of up to $25,000 per day or imprisonment for one year or both.
Amendments § 113(c)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-8(c)(1) (Supp. 1976).
35. Amendments § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970) (quoted in part in note 22
supra).
36. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
37. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. The explicit prohibition against
raising matters which should have been reviewed initially in the court of appeals suggests
that issues not specifically precluded can be asserted as defenses in enforcement actions.
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the discretion of the EPA. 8 To continue an allegedly unlawful activity
in the expectation of having objections to a state plan heard in an
enforcement proceeding is therefore to cede to the EPA's discretion any
control over the scope of the sanctions which may ultimately be im-
posed.
Thus, in spite of the presence of three distinct avenues of review, it
may be extremely difficult-as well as risky-to obtain adequate judi-
cial review of administrative action under the Amendments. In re-
sponse to this apparent lack of adequate statutory remedy, some indus-
tries have turned to a fourth, extra-statutory form of review to obtain
relief."' Specifically, an industry which is unable to have its objections
fully heard in an initial court of appeals proceeding and afraid of the
consequences of delay may seek extra-statutory federal judicial interven-
tion at some stage between plan approval and enforcement. For in-
stance, it may be desirable for the industry to obtain judicial review at
the time of issuance of a compliance order by the EPA. As will be
seen, however, difficulty and uncertainty have plagued these efforts to
proceed in the absence of specific statutory authorization and guidelines.
The Problem Exemplified: The West Penn Case
The problems an industry may face in obtaining adequate judicial
review under the Clean Air Amendments are well illustrated by the re-
cent case of West Penn Power Co. v. Train.40 Since the plaintiff's de-
mand in this case was for extra-statutory review of EPA and state action
under the Amendments, the Third Circuit was compelled to address it-
self to the general issue of meaningful judicial review of such admin-
istrative action. The difficulties experienced by the West Penn court in
reaching a convincingly reasoned resolution of the dispute before it
thus provide an excellent vehicle for further examination of the issue
and its implications.
As part of its plan implementing the national air quality standards,
Pennsylvania adopted standards limiting particulate and sulphur com-
pound emissions from stationary sources which directly affected a gener-
ating plant owned by the West Penn Power Company. The implemen-
tation plan was subsequently approved by the EPA." Instead of
38. See notes 17-19 supra and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., West Penn Power Co. v. Train, 522 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1975); Getty
Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125
(1973).
40. 522 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1975).
41. Pennsylvania adopted the implementation plan in January, 1972. See 25 PA.
CODE § 121-41. The particulate and sulphur compound emission regulations relevant to
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seeking review of this approval in a federal court of appeals, West Penn
petitioned the state for a statutory variance from the state plan.42  While
the variance application was pending, the EPA Administrator issued a
notice to West Penn that the generating plant was operating in violation
of the Pennsylvania implementation plan.43  The state subsequently
granted West Penn a partial variance, approving a temporary exception
to the sulphur compound emission standards, but rejecting the tall stack
scheme proposed by West Penn for future compliance and ordering the
company to begin installation of a "stack scrubber. ' 44  This temporary
variance was never approved by the EPA.45
West Penn then filed suit in federal district court seeking to enjoin
the EPA from acting on its violation notice, claiming it was not presently
in violation of the state implementation plan, and asking for a
declaratory judgment that its tall stack scheme was satisfactory for
future compliance. 48  The court dismissed the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction,47 and its decision was affirmed on appeal by
this case are contained in 25 PA. CODE § 123. The plan was approved by EPA on May
31, 1972. 37 Fed. Reg. 10889 (1972).
42. See generally 25 PA. CovE § 141; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4013.5 (Supp. 1975).
West Penn's application with the state was filed on September 15, 1972, and amended
on June 7, 1973. West Penn proposed to reduce sulphur compound pollution by burning
low-sulphur fuel and building a tall stack to disperse pollutants higher in the atmosphere.
522 F.2d at 305 nn.5 & 6.
43. The order was issued pursuant to Amendments § 113(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-
8(a) (1) (1970) (quoted in note 17 supra).
44. The state's ruling was issued in September of 1973 pursuant to PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, 09 4004(4), 4013.5 (Supp. 1975). West Penn appealed this initial ruling by the
Department of Environmental Resources to the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing
Board. See id. tit. 71, § 1710.41. This appeal had not been resolved at the time of the
decision in West Penn. 522 F.2d at 305-06 & n.11.
On the problems of sulphur compound pollution and the use of scrubbers to combat
it, see CouNciL ON ENVmONmENTAL QuALn, F-TH ANNUAL REPoRT 118-24 (1974);
CouNcIL ON ENViRONMENTAL QuALm', FoURTH ANNuAL REPORT 161-63 (1973).
45. A state variance or revision is ineffective without EPA approval. See note 15
supra and accompanying text.
46. West Penn Power Co. v. Train, 378 F. Supp. 941 (W.D. Pa. 1974), affd, 522
F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1975). The suit was filed in December of 1973. Named as
defendants were EPA Administrator Russell Train, the Secretary of the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Resources, and the Department itself.
47. 378 F. Supp. at 944-46. West Penn had claimed federal court jurisdiction on the
basis of the citizen suit provision of the Amendments, Amendments § 304, 42 U.S.C. §
1857h-2 (1970), the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970), the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. H9 2201-02 (1970),
and the commerce-related federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970). With
respect to Train, the court found that West Penn had failed to give him the sixty-day
notice required by the citizen suit provision, and that neither the APA, the Declaratory
Judgment Act, nor the commerce-related federal question statute constituted a sufficient
affirmative grant of jurisdiction to hear a matter not otherwise within its competence.
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the Third Circuit.4 Although admittedly confused by West Penn's
definition of the issues,4 9 the appellate court discerned and answered
three basic questions.
First, the court rejected the argument that both West Penn's claim
that it was not in violation of the Pennsylvania plan and its assertion that
a tall stack plan would ensure future compliance should have been
raised on direct review of EPA's approval of the Pennsylvania imple-
mentation plan.0 It adopted the test that suitability for initial court of
appeals review be determined according to whether the objection was to
the general nature of the plan or to the details of its application. Since
West Penn's claims were highly specific in nature and not challenges to
the plan itself, the company was not precluded from raising them at a
later time by its failure to raise them at the time of plan approval.,,
Next, the court addressed the question of whether there was any
jurisdictional basis for entertaining the suit. Rejecting West Penn's
argument that the Administrative Procedure Act conferred jurisdiction,
In any event, the court concluded, the initial review provision of the Amendments
precluded its consideration of these questions since the administrative action complained
of was taken in accordance with the Pennsylvania implementation plan, and West Penn
therefore should have objected to the plan itself at the time of its promulgation.
The district court relied on Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973), in holding that the relative specificity of the
objection to the plan is immaterial under the initial review provision. 378 F. Supp. at
945. Getty had failed to file a timely objection to the Delaware implementation plan in
the court of appeals. The company later sought district court review of the application
of a low-sulphur fuel regulation which, although stated in general terms, was worded in
such detail as to affect only Getty's facility. Getty argued that it accepted the plan
generally, and that its objection to the specific regulation was not the sort of challenge
envisioned by section 307(b). The court rejected this distinction. 467 F.2d at 355-56.
The district court in West Penn rejected the complaint against the Department of
Environmental Resources and its Secretary for lack of jurisdiction, noting also the
possibility of eleventh amendment difficulties. 378 F. Supp. at 947. It further suggested
that any relief it might provide with respect to the state defendants would be futile, since
any action they took in revising the Pennsylvania plan or granting variances would be
ineffective without EPA approval. Id. at 947-48.
48. West Penn Power Co. v. Train, 522 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1975). West Penn did
not challenge the lower court's rulings on the lack of jurisdiction under the Declaratory
Judgment Act and the commerce-related federal question statute.
49. See 522 F.2d at 308 n.25. Beyond alleging permissibile alternative arguments
under FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a), the court felt that West Penn's brief made serial arguments
based on mutually exclusive premises.
50. The court reasoned that "[t]he plan prescribes certain air quality standards ...
not specific means of attaining those standards." 522 F.2d at 309.
51. By way of illustration, the court distinguished its earlier holding in Getty Oil
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973), as
a case involving a challenge to the state regulations themselves and not to the specific
application of those regulations. 522 F.2d at 309 n.28. This aspect of the holding is
criticized at notes 66-69 infra and accompanying text.
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the court affirmed the lower court's dismissal.52 Alternatively, the court
stated, even if there were a jurisdictional basis for the suit, the adminis-
trative action involved would still not be reviewable because it lacked
finality and was "committed to agency discretion by law."53
Finally, the court rejected West Penn's claim that due process
required some present judicial review of the administrative action in
question, finding that two separate procedures assured the company of
its constitutional right to a meaningful hearing at a meaningful
time.54 To begin with, West Penn had its pending state administra-
tive and judicial review, which might ultimately have led to a revision of
the state plan in its favor. 55 Furthermore, the court noted, the EPA
52. 522 F.2d at 309-10. There has been an extensive debate in the literature over
the question of whether the APA confers jurisdiction on the federal district courts. See
notes 98-100 infra and accompanying text.
53. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2) (1970). Judicial review under the APA is governed by
sections 701 through 706. Id. § 701-06. The general statutory presumption is that
"[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof." Id. § 702. The principal exceptions to this presumption are situations
where "statutes preclude judicial review" or "agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law." Id. § 701(a). See generally Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n
v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 70-71 (1970); 4 DAVIs § 28.01 -.08;
JAFFE 372; Note, Statutory Preclusion of Judicial Review, supra note 6. Only final
agency action is reviewable. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970); see Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967); Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 160-
66 (1967). The reviewing court is empowered to compel agency action unlawfully
withheld or delayed, and to set aside agency action which is arbitrary, unconstitutional,
in excess of the agency's statutory authority, or not carried out in accordance with proper
procedural safeguards. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970); see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1970).
For an overview of APA judicial review, see 4 DAvis § 28; JAFFE 372 et seq.; Vining,
Direct Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative Law, 69 MICH.
L REv. 1443 (1971); Note, Reviewability of Administrative Action: The Elusive
Search for a Pragmatic Standard, 1974 DuKE LJ. 382; Note, The Judicial Role in
Defining Procedural Requirements for Agency Rulemaking, 87 HARv. L. REv. 782
(1974).
54. 522 F.2d at 312, citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965), and
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
55. The state review procedure is discussed in note 44 supra. The court recognized
that there is a presumption that state courts will enforce federal constitutional guaran-
tees. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975). Following Huffran, the
court stated that federal judicial intervention is improper under most circumstances until
a completed state action has been shown to have resolved a federal question inadequate-
ly. Id. at 606; 522 F.2d at 311-12 & n.32. The court followed the Supreme Court's
reasoning that "a party is not deprived of due process who, having no federal cause of
action, is relegated to the state courts for redress." 522 F.2d at 313, citing Murdock v.
City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 632 (1875); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592 (1975).
In support of its contentions, West Penn referred the court to its earlier decision in
Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973), modified, 522 F.2d 1186
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would have to bring suit in a federal court to enforce the state plan.
Since the questions raised by West Penn would not have been initially
reviewable, they presumably could be presented as defenses in an en-
forcement action. Therefore, there would be an opportunity for fed-
eral judicial review of West Penn's claims if the threat of federal pen-
alty were ever to ripen into actuality.5
AN ANALYSIS OF West Penn AND A PROPOSED
FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
While the West Penn court achieved a defensible disposition of the
particular dispute before it, its handling of the underlying issues on
which the holding is based reflects the inadequacy of the analytical
techniques now employed in dealing with the problem situations most
Commonly encountered in obtaining judicial review under the Amend-
ments. The following discussion will focus individually on several of
these problem areas in an attempt to develop a reasonable analytical
approach and suggest a generally applicable framework for resolving
questions of judicial reviewability under the Amendments.
(3d Cir. 1975). There, the plaintiff utility challenged the Pennsylvania imple-
mentation plan in a section 307(b) action, claiming inadequate opportunity to
be heard in the state decision-making process. The Duquesne court agreed, and
required EPA to remedy the procedural defects by conducting a limited legis-
lative hearing itself or by staying federal enforcement procedures pending Du-
quesne's pursuit of more adequate state remedies. Id. at 10. The West Penn court
distinguished its earlier decision, emphasizing that the Duquesne holding was based on
an initial finding that the state hearing was inadequate. Id. at 9. As the West Penn
court correctly asserted, Duquesne did not hold that relegation to a state remedy was per
se violative of due process. But see Buckeye Power Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 169-73
(6th Cir. 1973). See also Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d I (3d Cir. 1973),
modified, 522 F.2d 1186 (3d Cir. 1975); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495,
502-03 (4th Cir. 1973).
On the detailed procedural requirements for the various forms of hearings provided
under the Amendments, see South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir.
1974); Delaware Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Administrator U.S. EPA, 480 F.2d 972
(3d Cir. 1973); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The general
procedural requirements for administrative hearings are set forth at 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-57
(1970). These statutes have been authoritatively construed in United States v. Alleghe-
ny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972), and United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry.,
410 U.S. 224 (1973). Procedural requirements are reviewed generally in Note, The
Judicial Role in Defining Procedural Requirements for Agency Rulemaking, supra note
53.
56. West Penn also had a right to confer with the Administrator concerning the
violation charged before enforcement could be undertaken. Amendments § 113(a)(4),
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(4) (1970). West Penn met with the Administrator, and was
granted sixty-day extensions of the deadlines for initiating compliance. The court
characterized these conferences as "a second route to relief." 522 F.2d at 312 & n.33.
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Initial Court of Appeals Review
In determining what issues are suitable for initial review of EPA
approval of a state tmplementation plan, the courts must balance Con-
gress's clear primary intent of expediting improvement in air quality"'
with its expressed sensitivity to the need for adequate judicial review of
administrative action taken in pursuit of that goal.5 8 It must be remem-
bered as well that preventing litigation at an early stage in the process
will not necessarily produce the most rapid changes in industrial prac-
tices, since deferral of objections will necessarily prolong the enforce-
ment process.59
There are two possible approaches to limiting the scope of initial
review in the federal circuit courts. First, the courts might put substan-
tive limits on the subject matter of allowable objections which may be
raised at this time. Specifically, the argument has been made that the
plan and revision approval provisions of the Amendments should be
construed to permit the EPA to consider only the evaluative criteria
enumerated in that provision in deciding whether to approve a particular
state plan. ° The court reviewing EPA action on the plan, it is argued,
should therefore be restricted to these same criteria in evaluating such
action. The circuits are currently split on the issue, with resolution by
the Supreme Court possible.61
57. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., SENATE REPORT 40-41.
59. The West Penn litigation, for example, involved a state plan promulgated in
January, 1972. The case was not resolved until July, 1975. See also Getty Oil Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973) (more
than two years between issuance of state plan and end of litigation). See notes 68-
69 infra and accompanying text.
60. This construction would exclude from consideration questions of economic and
technical feasibility. See note 61 infra.
61. The courts have been in conflict regarding whether the Administrator, and
therefore the courts reviewing his determination, can consider only the criteria enumerat-
ed in sections 110(a) (2) (A)-(H), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-a(2)(A)-(H) (1970), in approv-
ing or disapproving a state plan or revision, or whether the scope of the evaluation may
be expanded to include such factors as economic and technological feasibility. The
Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have found, in varying contexts, that economic
and technological feasibility are legitimate concerns for the Administrator in evaluating a
state plan. See St. Joe Mineral Corp. v. EPA, 508 F.2d 743, 747 (3d Cir. 1975), peti-
tion for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. June 28, 1975); Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905, 914 (9th Cir. 1974); Appalachian Power Co. v.
EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 506 (4th Cir. 1973); Buckeye Power Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162,
169 (6th Cir. 1973). The relevance of nonstatutory criteria to the Administrator's de-
termination has been rejected by the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits. See Texas
v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 314-15 (5th Cir. 1974); Indiana & Mich. Elee. Co. v. EPA, 509
F.2d 839, 843 (7th Cir. 1975); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206, 215-16 (8th
Cir. 1975).
The more convincing arguments have been made by the Uion Electric court, which
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Alternatively, or additionally, the courts might impose generic
limitations on the types of objections permitted in initial review actions.
In particular, objections to the general guidelines established by a state
plan might be allowed at this time, while objections to the details of the
plan's application to particular industries might not. In West Penn, the
district court followed the more common practice 62 of not making this
distinction. 3 The appellate court, however, attempted to impose such a
generic restriction in rejecting the lower court's analysis and holding that
a complaint concerning the specific application of a plan to a particular
polluter was not an objection to that plan within the meaning of the
initial review provision of the Amendments.6"
The specificity criterion proposed, although attractive by reason of
its apparently broad applicability, is inherently unworkable. The West
Penn court was inaccurate in its initial assumption that the state plans
intended for initial court of appeals review are very general documents.
On the contrary, the plans must be highly specific with respect to
inspection, regulation, and enforcement.65 It is difficult to see how a
potentially affected industry could make a meaningful objection to a
state plan without making reference to the specific provisions and
applications threatening its interests.
The workability problem is reflected in the Third Circuifts own
experience. For example, the court in West Penn failed to explain
supported its position with a wide-ranging review of expressions of congressional intent.
See, e.g., SENATE REPORT 2-3; 116 CONG. REc. 32,900-05 (1970) (remarks of Senator
Muskie). The court pointed out that other courts had erroneously relied on the history
of the House bill in discerning congressional intent, misled by the fact that the
Conference Committee had technically agreed on the House bill. The substance of the
stronger Senate bill, however, was retained in the version which was finally enacted.
Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206, 215 & n.30 (7th Cir. 1975). An example of er-
roneous judicial interpretation of the legislative history can be found in Buckeye Power
Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 168 (6th Cir. 1973).
Resolution of the question may be forthcoming, as a petition for certiorari has been
filed in the St. Joe Mineral case. Language used by the Court in Train v. Natural
Resources Defense Council regarding the imperative force of the word "shall" suggests
that its ruling may favor the Union Electric position:
§ 110(a)(3) requires the Agency to approve "any revision" which is con-
sistent with § 110(a)(2)'s minimum standards for an initial plan, and which
the State adopted after reasonable public notice and hearing; no other restric-
tions whatsoever are placed on the Agency's duty to approve revisions. Train
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 98 (1975) (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).
See generally Bleicher, Economic and Technological Feasibility in Clean Air Act
Enforcement Against Stationary Sources, 89 HAiv. L. REv. 316 (1975).
62. See note 70 infra and accompanying text.
63. See note 47 supra.
64. 522 F.2d at 308-09.
65. See, for example, the dispute over the alleged lack of specificity in the New York
plan in Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 499 F,2d 1118, 1123-24 (2d Cir. 1974).
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adequately the apparent conflict in its rulings on the specificity issue in
that case and in Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus.66 Getty's claim, couched
in terms of a general objection to the state plan, was found reviewable
even though the Deleware regulations at issue were worded so specifically
as to be applicable only to the Getty facility.67  Rather than providing
useful guidance regarding what types of issues should be presented at
what stages of the statutory process, the two cases taken together imply
that the Third Circuit will be influenced most strongly by the phrasing
of the pleadings in deciding this crucial question.
From a practical standpoint, it is wholly irrelevant whether the
West Penn court was technically accurate in its attempted distinction of
Getty. The problem lies in the very necessity of making distinctions as
fine as that between an objection to a detail appearing on the face of a
state plan and an objection to a detail arising out of the plan's applica-
tion. Regardless of the logic of its position, the fact remains that twice
in three years the Third Circuit has faced lengthy litigation in which a
;clarification of that position was sought.ms Such litigation can result
only in delay and a frustration of Congress's purpose in enacting the
Amendments.6"
There have been no cases directly on this point in the other circuits.
It may be significant that specificity as bearing on initial reviewability
was not discussed in a number of similar cases where review was granted
to litigants who were obviously concerned only with the application of
the details of a state plan to their own -facilities.70  No other court has
rejected an objection presented for initial review as overly specific.
Further, the Supreme Court's refusal in its recent decision in Train v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.71 to distinguish "postpone-
ments" from "variances" or "revisions" on the basis of specificity is
66. 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). The case is
discussed in note 47 supra.
67. Id. at 353:
IThe State Water and Air Resources Commission adopted Regulation IX
limiting the amount of sulphur content of fuel burned in New Castle County
south of United States Route 40 by fuel burning equipment having a maximum
rate of heat input equal to or greater than 50,000,000 b.t.u. per hour to 3.5%.
The Delmarva power station is the only installation presently operating such
equipment in the area.
68. See note 59 supra.
69. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. EPA, 508 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1975); South
Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974) (review of EPA plans promulgat-
ed in default of state plan); Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1303 (10th
Cir. 1973) (implying that specific objection would have been reviewable if properly
made insection 307(b) action).
71. 421 U.S. 60, 97-98 (1975). The case is discussed in note 15 supra.
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collateral evidence that so unworkable a standard will be found gen-
erally unacceptable.
Once the Supreme Court has resolved the issue of subject matter
limitations on initial review,72 the courts should reject the imposition of
any generic criteria beyond that of reasonable foreseeability.73 Af-
fected industries should be required to make any objections which are
reasonably foreseeable at the time of EPA approval in the court of
appeals at that time. Objections found in subsequent federal proceed-
ings to have been initially foreseeable should not be heard.74
Using a foreseeability criterion, the objections raised in both West
Penn and Getty would have been found suitable for initial review in the
court of appeals, with later review thus foreclosed. In each case, the
affected industry was able to develop its objection to the state plan at the
time of promulgation. 75 Since the grounds for objection were foreseea-
ble, the factors cited by the West Penn court in distinguishing Getty
would have been irrelevant under this test.76
Consider, by way of contrast, the situation of an industry subject to
a state plan which affects its present operations as well as prospective
modifications of those operations. If such an industry were to raise a
general objection to the plan at some time after promulgation when the
substance of its objection became more defined, a court using the West
Penn analysis might refuse review on the grounds that any objection to
the general provisions of a plan can be heard only in an initial court of
appeals proceeding.77 Under a foreseeability standard, however, the
72. See note 61 supra.
73. For a discussion of the legal concept of foreseeability in the context of tort law,
ee W. PaOssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw op TORTS 250-70 (4th ed. 1971). The criterion
of foresecability proposed here is analytically the same as that used in determining tort
liability.
74. See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text. The foreseeability criterion
should also be employed in construing the exception to the foreclosure provision for
objections arising after the thirty-day period for initial review has expired. Amendments
§ 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (Supp. 1976). An objection would be held
to have arisen after the thirty-day period if it could not have been foreseen within that
period. Cf. Oljato Chapter of the Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654, 665 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (reflecting the difficulties of determining precisely when the grounds for an
objection have arisen).
75. In West Penn, the utility was able to develop its objection in the form of a state
variance request shortly after EPA approval of the Pennsylvania plan. 522 F.2d at 305.
A state variance was also promptly applied for in Getty. 467 F.2d at 353.
76. See notes 66-67 supra and accompanying text.
77. Since its objection was in fact to the terms of the original plan, an industry in
this position could not rely wholly on its ability to invoke the statutory exception to
foreclosure for objections based on grounds arising solely after the thirty-day period for
initial review. See note 74 supra.
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industry might argue successfully that the scope of its objection was not
sufficiently foreseeable to have been meaningfully litigated initially. An
industry in such a position would therefore hold its objection until it
could be fully aired in a single dispositive action, rather than bringing a
series of inconclusive and time-consuming actions out of fear of foreclo-
sure.
78
The adoption of such a standard would, of course, result in
additional cases coming before the court of appeals for initial review.
Court time, however, would seem better devoted to substantive determi-
nations than to the type of unproductive legal wrangling exemplified by
West Penn. Substituting a widely accepted legal concept for the chi-
merical notion of specificity could not help but simplify the judicial
review process, with an overall result of greater accommodation to
Congress's primary concerns.
Subsequent Review of Issues Not Initially Reviewable
In light of the congressional policy against the use of litigation as a
delaying tactic,79 the final enforcement proceeding should be the pri-
mary forum for raising issues not earlier foreclosed. In principle, there
are no limits to the form or substance of the defenses which can be
asserted in an enforcement action."0 As West Penn illustrates, however,
situations will arise in which due process will require judicial review of
administrative action which falls short of actual enforcement.
As the West Penn court accurately observed, "due process is
protean, its actual form at any time being a function of the rights and
interests at stake in a given proceeding.""1 Yet, in light of the "rights
and interests" at stake in West Penn, the court's application of the
standard thus articulated in concluding that the utility had had and
would have opportunities for "meaningful" hearings at "meaningful"
times is unacceptable. 2
First, although a state proceeding is not per se an inadequate
means of vindicating federal rights, 8 it does not appear that the admin-
istrative and judicial proceedings which West Penn had initiated were
capable of providing it with adequate protection from allegedly urea-
78. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
79. See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
80. See note 37 supra.
81.. 522 F.2d at 312 n.35, citing Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 610
(1974).
82. See notes 54-55 supra and cases cited therein.
83. See note 55 supra.
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sonable EPA action. Any state modification of the plan to accommo-
date West Penn would be ineffective without EPA approval.8 4  Such
state action could therefore have no impact on an EPA determination to
cite West Penn for a violation of the plan.s5 The agency would be
acting pursuant to an independent federal statutory duty, and, consider-
ing the purposes of joint state-federal enforcement, it would not appear
to be bound by state action. 6
Second, the notion that an enforcement proceeding would provide
a meaningful opportunity to review the EPA's issuance of a violation
notice is illusory.8 7 The reviewability of the notice itself is premised on
its effect in setting a time from which penalties may accumulate. But
the timing of the enforcement proceeding, and therefore the period
during which daily fines may accrue, is entirely in the hands of the
agency. 8 To rely on this form of review in a factual context similar to
that in West Penn would be effectively -to give the agency absolute
control over the extent of the penalty which might be imposed.8 9  Thus,
84. See notes 14-19 supra and accompanying text.
85. See notes 16-19 supra and accompanying text.
86. See SENATE REPORT 21: "If the Secretary ['Administrator' in the final version]
should find that a state or local pollution control agency is not acting to abate violations
of implementation plans or to enforce certification requirements, he would be expected to
use the full force of Federal law." A state administrative or judicial construction of a
plan which the Administrator found to be overly lenient would seem to provide exactly
the kind of situation in which Congress intended him to exercise his independent
enforcement authority. In light of this expression of clear congressional intent, it is
likely that state determinations on the validity of variances or revisions would be held to
have no binding effect on a federal court in an enforcement proceeding.
87. 522 F.2d at 319 (Adams, J., dissenting).
88. See notes 17-19 supra and accompanying text. Note that there is no apparent
outside restriction on the time within which enforcement proceedings must be initiated.
Fines would presumably continue to accumulate pending final enforcement.
89. It should be emphasized that, despite the comparability of certain aspects of the
two cases, West Penn's problem was not the so-called "Getty dilemma." Duquesne Light
Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1, 7-8 (3d Cir. 1973); Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d
349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). In Getty, the plaintiff chose to
pursue a state remedy in place of federal court of appeafs review. The Getty court held
correctly that Congress's intent was clear that the decision not to seek federal review
when available could not be used to defeat or delay federal enforcement. See also Train
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 92 (1975): "This litigation [over
variances, referring to Getty] is carried out on the polluter's time, not the public's for
during its pendency the original regulations remain in effect, and the polluter's fail-
ure to comply may subject him to a variety of enforcement procedures." In West
Penn, however, the court held not that the polluter had neglected his federal remedy for
purposes of delay, but that he had not had a right to such a remedy. West Penn was
therefore in the very different position of being subject to a federal determination having
substantial impact on it without ever having had. an opportunity for meaningful federal
review.
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close analysis of the options available to West Penn reveals that the
company had no real opportunity for a "meaningful" hearing on its
claims.
But, even where the need for intermediate judicial review can be
shown, the question of a jurisdictional base remains. In determining
the feasibility of any approach to the jurisdiction problem, two related
questions must be answered: first, whether the base claimed actually
constitutes an affirmative grant of jurisdiction; and second, whether the
facts presented are likely to be found ripe for review.
Within the Amendments themselves, the citizen suit provision is
the only arguable source of jurisdiction for intermediate federal re-
view." Unfortunately, West Penn provides little guidance on the ques-
tion, since the court rejected citizen suit jurisdiction on procedural
grounds without comment on the general applicability of the provision
to this type of situation.91 As noted earlier, the manifest purpose of the
provision is to provide a public check on EPA vigilance. 2 Recent
Supreme Court dicta on the nature of administrative discretion under
the Amendments suggest, however, that West Penn might have success-
fully invoked the provision if it had followed the proper notice proce-
dure and had directed its complaint toward EPA's refusal to approve the
state variance it was ultimately granted. Since the revision approval
provision states that the agency "shall approve" a revision of a state plan
meeting enumerated criteria, 4 West Penn, had it claimed that Pennsyl-
vania was revising its plan by granting the variance, might have received
a court hearing on the EPA's alleged failure to perform its non-discre-
tionary duty of plan revision approval. 5
90. Amendments § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970) (quoted in part in note 22
supra).
91. 522 F.2d at 307 & n. 20. See note 47 supra.
92. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.
93. See Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 80, 98 (1975).
Although the term "non-discretionary" was not used, the Court found that the words
"shall approve" in the plan revision section "required" the Administrator to approve a
revision meeting the statutory criteria.
94. Amendments § I10(a)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 157-5(a) (3) (A) (Supp. 1976).
95. West Penn would assert, in other words, that the Supreme Court's use of the
word "required" in Train necessarily implied a non-discretionary duty of the Administra-
tor to approve its request for a variance if it did not result in the Pennsylvania plan
being revised in contravention of the minimal statuory criteria. See note 14 supra and
accompanying text. A court taking review jurisdiction under the citizen suit provision
would presumably go on to evaluate the proposed variance in terms of those criteria,
specified in Amendments H9 ll0(a)(2)(A)-(H), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1857-5(a)(2)(A)-
(H) (Supp. 1976).
Having taken jurisdiction, the federal court could then have exercised pendent
jurisdiction to explore the legally and factually related questions of West Penn's present
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The use of the citizen suit provision to obtain jurisdiction in this
situation is admittedly an artificial device. While a particular industry
may technically qualify to bring suit under the provision, it is actually
seeking review in its capacity as an industry adversely affected by EPA
action under the Amendments rather than in its capacity as a "person"
policing EPA laxity in enforcement. Nonetheless, it is a device which
will accomplish a legitimate purpose. Implicit in the West Penn opin-
ion is the constant conflict between the court's desire to follow Con-
gress's intent exactly and its concern that the needs of due process and
basic equality be met. The court seemed to be sensitive to the cogency
of the argument for review, but refused to stretch the statute beyond its
literal terms in finding the necessary jurisdictional grant.9 6 Invoking
citizen suit jurisdiction in the manner suggested would allow a court to
follow its equitable leanings without violating the terms of the Amend-
ments in cases where the needs of both the affected industry and the
environment would be best served by prompt judicial resolution of a
critical question.
The Administrative Procedure Act97 is a second possible source of
jurisdiction for intermediate judicial review. The West Penn court,
relying without supporting reasoning on a series of prior Third Circuit
decisions, held that the APA did not confer jurisdiction, but merely
specified the procedure for review where a case was otherwise within a
federal court's jurisdiction." However, while this holding accords with
the interpretation adopted by several other circuits,99 there has been
and prospective violation of the state plan. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715 (1966). Potential claims of eleventh amendment immunity by state officials have
been circumvented by courts applying comparably integrated state-federal statutory
schemes. See River v. Richmond Metropolitan Authority, 359 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va.),
aff'd, 481 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1973); Connecticut Union of Welfare Employees v.
White, 357 F. Supp. 1378 (D. Conn. 1973). This jurisdictional alternative has been
previously suggested in Luneburg & Roselle, Judicial Review Under the Clean Ait
Amendments of 1970, 15 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 667, 691 n.145 (1974).
96. The conflict was expressed more explicitly by the lower court. Compare 378 F.
Supp. at 945 with 378 F. Supp. at 946-47.
97. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970).
98. 522 F.2d at 309-11 & n.29; see PBW Stock Exchange, Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718,
729 (3d Cir. 1973); Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, 356 (3d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Zimmerman v. United States Gov't, 422 F.2d 326,
330 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970). The court put special emphasis on
the Supreme Court's "favorable citation" of Getty in Train. 522 F.2d at 310 n.29. The
Supreme Court, however, cited Getty on an unrelated point. Train v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 92 (1975).
99. For cases holding that the APA does not afford a basis for jurisdiction, see
Bramblett v. Desobry, 490 F.2d 405, 407 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974);
Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, 356 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1125 (1973); Arizona State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Department of HEW, 449 F.2d
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no definitive Supreme Court ruling on the question, and there is con-
flicting authority both among and within the circuits. 100 Thus, the
availability at present of the APA as a jurisdictional basis will depend
upon the circuit in which the action is brought.
456, 464 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919 (1972); Pan Am. World Airways v.
CAB, 392 F.2d 483, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete,
278 F.2d 912, 914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 894 (1960).
100. A number of courts taking the opposite position have stated it in absolute terms,
failing even to suggest the necessity of dealing with the contrary view: "Jurisdiction over
the United States defendants for the federal statutory claims . . . is conferred by the
Administrative Procedure Act ... ." River v. Richmond Metropolitan Authority, 359
F. Supp. 611, 622 (E.D. Va.), af 'd, 481 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1973) (emphasis added).
Other cases which rely on the APA as a grant of jurisdiction include Oljato Chapter of
the Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654, 663-64 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (dicta); Elton
Orchards, Inc. v. Brennan, 508 F.2d 493, 497 (lst Cir. 1974); Pickus v. United States
Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Albert v. Chafee, 465 F.2d 367,
368 (9th Cir. 1972).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has taken almost every conceivable
position on the subject:
In various decisions, the [jurisdictional] sufficiency of the A.P.A. has been
explicitly upheld, Citizens Committee for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d
97, 102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 . . . (1970), explicitly stated
by Judge Lumbard in a concurring opinion, Rosado v. Wyman, 414 F.2d 170,
181 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 397 U.S. 397 . . . (1970),
assumed, Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1, 5-6 (2d Cir. 1966), doubted,
Wolff v. Selective Service Board, 372 F.2d 817, 826 (2d Cir. 1967), and,
most recently, said to be an open question, Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d
1090 (2d Cir. 1973.) [cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974)]. Connecticut Union
of Welfare Employees v. White, 357 F. Supp. 1378, 1379 (D. Conn. 1973)
(upholding jurisdiction).
As evidence of a strong overall presumption in favor of reviewability, the courts
favoring APA jurisdiction have relied on the legislative history of the Act, see, e.g., H.R.
R P. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946); S. RPP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
26 (1945); the collaterally relevant Supreme Court holdings, see Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 136 (1967); Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967); Rusk v. Cort,
369 U.S. 367 (1962); Frozen Foods Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956);
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); and the common law
trends underlying the APA, see 4 DAvis §§ 28.01 -.07; lJAPr 320-94. These courts have
inferred, in light of this presumption, that an expansive view properly governs the
determination of jurisdiction. Contrary arguments have been premised on the general
philosophy that federal courts should not grope for jurisdiction where an explicit
statutory grant is lacking, see cases cited in note 98 supra, and the language of the APA.
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1970), which refers to an "action ... in a court of
competent jurisdiction," suggesting that an independent jurisdictional base is necessary.
But see 4 DAvis § 28.08. Professor Davis argues that a presumption of reviewability
arises unequivocally from the face of the statute and that no construction is necessary.
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970): "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action.., is entitled to judicial review ....
Part of the problem may lie in the courts' frequent confusion of the related and
often overlapping, but still logically separate, concepts of jurisdiction and ripeness. In
purporting to discuss the presence or absence of a jurisdictional grant, many courts have,
for example, evaluated the relative finality of the agency action, although this point bears
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It would appear as well that a federal court could assume jurisdic-
tion over a suit like West Pen's pursuant to either the general federal
question statute10 1 or the commerce-related federal question statute. 10 2
In general terms, these statutes afford a basis for jurisdiction when a
particular cause of action "arises under" federal law. In the case of a
general federal question, there is an additional requirement that the
amount in controversy exceed $10,000.1° While a similar jurisdictional
amount is not required for commerce-related jurisdiction, the federal
law involved in this instance must be one "regulating commerce."'0 4
In West Penn, the EPA, acting pursuant to the mandate of a
federal law bearing on interstate commerce, issued a notice of violation
of a state plan which the agency's approval had effectively incorporated
into federal law. In terms of either prospective fines or cost of compli-
ance, West Penn clearly had more than $10,000 at stake. Thus,
jurisdiction arguably could have been founded on either federal question
jurisdiction statute. The court recognized that such jurisdiction might
have been proper, but chose not to make such a determination on its
own initiative. 0 5 There is no direct authority to support such jurisdic-
tion, but two federal district courts have held that the commerce-related
only on the ripeness of the problem for judicial review. See, e.g., National Ethical
Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Weinberger, 503 F.2d 1051, 1052 (4th Cir. 1974); Independent
Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 500 F.2d 812, 814 (D.C. Cir.
1974). See generally JAFFE 395-423; Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Admin-
Istrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter
Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 Micn. L. REv. 387, 443-46 (1970).
In West Penn, the majority and the dissent argued past each other on the question
of "jurisdiction." The majority pointed out preliminarily that there was no affirmative
grant of jurisdiction to bring the case within the general competence of the federal court.
522 F.2d at 313-14. The dissent purported to answer this contention by arguing that
the case met the established ripeness criteria for review of administrative action. Id. at
317-20. This argument, of course, did nothing more than assume the invalidity of the
majority's basic premise, that affirmative jurisdiction was lacking.
101. "Mhe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000. . .and arises under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970).
102. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or
proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade
and commerce against restraints and monopolies." Id. § 1337. See Dunlop v. Bachows-
ki, 421 U.S. 560, 566 (1975).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970).
104. Id. § 1337.
105. 522 F.2d at 308 & n.26. In reaching decisions, federal courts, of course, are not
limited to rationales urged on them by the parties. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
is a famous example of an important case which was decided on a point not briefed or
argued by the parties. The court apparently did not act here because of its belief that
the question was not ripe for review in any event.
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federal question statute would provide a jurisdictional basis for suits
brought under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).' ° G
The secondary problem of whether an intermediate EPA action is
sufficiently final to be ripe for review is illustrated by the conflict within
the West Penn court itself. Evaluating the facts before it in light of the
apposite Supreme Court decisions, the court found that the mere issu-
ance of a violation notice was without substantial coercive effect,10 7 was
neither formal, definitive, nor self-executing in its impact,108 and hence
was not ripe for review. As the dissent correctly pointed out, however,
the majority took an overly technical view of the concept of finality. The
tenor of the pertinent Supreme Court holdings is that finality is to be
determined by balancing the practical impact of the agency action on the
affected parties against the threat of disruption of the administrative
process, all viewed from the perspective of a strong presumption of
reviewability. 10 9
By any reasonable standard of practicality, the impact on West
Penn of the EPA's issuance of a violation notice was final and substan-
tial. Since the timing of the notice would determine the scope of any
penalty imposed, 10° West Penn was confronted with the choice of ignor-
ing the notice in reliance on its belief that it was innocent of any
violation, with the possibility of having daily fines assessed from that
106. Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1974);
Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, U.S. Army, 349 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
107. 522 F.2d at 311, citing Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States, 316 U.s.
407, 418 (1942).
108. 522 F.2d at 311, citing Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 151
(1967); Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 162, 171 (1967).
109. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967):
The cases dealing with judicial review of administrative action have interpreted
the "finality" element in a pragmatic way ....
This is also a case in which the impact of the regulations upon the petitioners
is sufficiently direct and immediate as to render the issue appropriate for ju-
dicial review at this stage. Id. at 149, 152.
See also United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 198 (1956); Frozen
Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40, 43-45 (1956); Columbia Broadcasting Sys.
v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 418-19 (1942).
The Court has subsequently restated its pragmatic emphasis in a more explicit
formula: "mhe relevant considerations in determining finality are whether the process
of administrative decisionmaking has reached a stage where judicial review will not
disrupt the orderly process of adjudication and whether rights or obligations have been
determined.. . ." Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transat-
lantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970).
110. See notes 17-19, 88 supra and accompanying text.
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point should a court later find against it, or undertaking the inevitably
expensive process of compliance."'
Administrative functioning would not appear to be seriously threat-
ened by allowing review in such circumstances. The issue of whether
the EPA had been correct in finding West Penn in violation of the state
plan would ultimately have to be litigated in an enforcement proceeding
in any event. The implicit basis of West Penn's claim was that the
agency, by failing to initiate enforcement proceedings immediately, had
delayed this required judicial interpretation of the plan in derogation of
its interests.
Finally, an action which is ripe may still be held unreviewable if it
is committed to the discretion of the agency in question, since the court
would then have no objective standards to apply."1 In finding a
commitment to agency discretion in West Penn, the court relied on the
fact that the EPA would have discretion in choosing the mode of
enforcement. The court noted that the violation notice provision of the
Amendments is worded imperatively, but that in taking further action
the agency has two options, either of which it "may" pursue.1. 3 The
court emphasized that there is no explicit statutory language controlling
if or when the agency must initiate enforcement.
It was the non-discretionary issuance of a violation notice, however,
and not the prospective enforcement action which was the subject of the
review sought in West Penn. The original violation notice would
similarly be the source of the threat to other affected industries finding
themselves in West Penn's position and seeking intermediate judicial
review. Surely the existence or non-existence of a violation of a highly
specific state plan is susceptible of objective determination. The mere
presence of an element of discretion at a later stage of the process should
not defeat reviewability when there are workable standards to apply.1 14
111. West Penn claimed that installation of a scrubber would cost $23 million, and
that its operation would add $6.5 million to annual expenses. 522 F.2d at 318 n.30
(Adams, J., dissenting).
112. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2) (1970). See note 53 supra.
113. Whenever, on the basis of any information available to him, the Administra-
tor finds that any person is in violation of any requirement of an applicableimplementation plan, the Administrator shall notify the person in violation of
the plan . . . . If such violation extends beyond the 30th day after the date
of the Administrator's notification, the Administrator may issue an order
requiring such person to comply with the requirements of such plan or he may
bring a civil action in accordance with subsection (b) of this section. Amend-
ments § 113(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(1) (1970) (emphasis added).
114. Congress intended, and the courts have consistently held, that the discretion
exception is to be very narrowly applied. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971); S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945).
The presence of any workable legal standard is usually enough to defeat the exception.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is urged that the courts adopt a consistent policy
toward judicial review under the Clean Air Amendments. In doing so,
the judiciary would aid industries subject to the Amendments in under-
standing, meeting, and where appropriate, challenging their obligations,
without impairing the spirit or functioning of the law..1 5
As a first step, the courts must define the scope of the issues
suitable for initial review in the court of appeals. The court's attempt in
West Penn to establish a criterion of specificity should be rejected. All
objections, specific or general, to state plans and revisions or their
application which are reasonably foreseeable at the time of promulga-
tion should be committed to exclusive review under the initial review
provision. In deciding whether to impose substantive restrictions on the
subject matter of initial review proceedings, the lower courts will, of
course, follow any Supreme Court determination of whether the
EPA's action in evaluating plans and revisions is to be guided
solely by the enumerated minimum plan requirements.116  Any com-
See, e.g., East Oakland-Fruitvale Planning Council v. Rumsfeld, 471 F.2d 524, 534 (9th
Cir. 1972); Soanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
The language of the APA virtually compels such a construction. If the presence of any
element of discretion were enough to preclude review under the discretion excep-
tion, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2) (1970), then 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1970), allowing agency
action to be set aside for "abuse of discretion," would be rendered meaningless. See
generally 4 DAVIs § 28.16; JAFFE 359-63.
When all other preliminary questions have been resolved, the issue of the sovereign
immunity of the United States Government remains. See generally Cramton, supra note
100, at 396-436. It has most often been held that a finding of reviewability under tha
APA will not in itself overcome the problem of sovereign immunity, but this approach
has been criticized by the commentators almost without exception. See, e.g., Byse,
Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity,
Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1479 (1962); Cramton, supra note
100, at 417-36, 417 n.143. See generally 3 DAvis ch. 27; JAFFE 197-98, 213-31, 229
n.123. It is arguable that the various judicial review provisions of the Amendments,
especially the citizen suit provision, imply a general waiver of sovereign immunity with
respect to suits arising from administration of the Amendments. But see Kentucky ex
rel. Hancock v. Ruckelshaus, 497 F.2d 1172, 1176 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. granted sub
norm. Hancock v. Train, 420 U.S. 971 (1975) (holding sovereign immunity was not
waived except to the limited extent that the Amendments specifically granted review).
The problem of sovereign immunity as a bar to suits does not seem to have been
considered by Congress in its deliberations on the Amendments.
115. A number of pre-Train articles have urged various courses of policy on courts
conducting judicial review under the Amendments. See, e.g., Luneberg, supra note 16;
Luneburg & Roselle, supra note 95 at 671-93; Comment, Coordinating the EPA, NEPA,
and the Clean Air Act, supra note 23, at 550-57; Comment, Variance Procedures Under
the Clean Air Act, supra note 2.
116. See note 61 supra.
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plaints regarding unlawful administrative action which are not ini-
tially cognizable should be heard as defenses in statutory enforcement
actions brought by the agency.
In certain fact situations, due process and considerations of fairness
may impose a further requirement of federal judicial review of interme-
diate EPA action falling short of enforcement but having the practical
impact of finality. Where these considerations apply, the federal courts
should be able to derive an adequate jurisdictional grant from one of
three sources: the Administrative Procedure Act, the general and com-
merce-related federal question statutes, or, where the complaint takes
the form of an objection to EPA refusal to approve a state plan revision
in the plaintiff's favor, the citizen suit provision of the Amendments.
The decisions to be made must be guided by constant reference to
Congress's primary concern in enacting the Amendments, that of expe-
diting a significant reduction in air pollution. Public health and welfare
were given clear priority over considerations of economics and conve-
nience.11 7 At the same time, it must be remembered that Congress
expressed a complementary sensitivity to the established principles of
judicial control over administrative action.11 8
117. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
118. See SENATE REPoRT 40-41.
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